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Abstract
We empirically investigate the relevance of multi-homing in two-sided markets. First, we build
a micro-founded structural econometric model that encompasses demand for differentiated products
and allows for multi-homing on both sides of the market. We then use an original dataset on the Italian
daily newspaper market that includes information on double-homing by readers to estimate readers’
and advertisers’ demand. The results show that an econometric model that does not allow for multi-
homing is likely to produce biased estimates of demand on both sides of the market. In particular, on
the reader side, accounting for multi-homing helps to recognize complementarity between products;
on the advertising side, it allows to measure to what extent advertising demand depends on the shares
of exclusive and overlapping readers.
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Two-sided markets are markets in which firms sell two products or services to two different types of
consumers, taking into account that the two demands are linked by indirect network effects. Examples
of such markets are media markets, where demand for advertising is related to the size of the audience,
and the market for online social networks, where advertising demand depends on the number of users.
With the emergence of digital technologies, multi-homing, i.e. users patronizing multiple outlets, has
become a widespread phenomenon in media markets. For instance, newspaper readers can now access
multiple online news outlets with just a few clicks, no longer needing to buy and carry a pile of different
newspapers, then physically leafing through them. Similarly, TV viewers now have access to many more
digital channels. Thus, effectively consumers more frequently multi-home.
We empirically study the role of multi-homing in two-sided markets. First, we build an econometric
model that encompasses demand on both sides of the market and allows for multi-homing on each side.
We then estimate the model using data on Italian daily newspapers, alternatively taking into account and
not taking into account information on multi-homing by readers.
Readers’ demand is estimated using a nested logit model, where the structure of the nests draws on
the traditional classification of national daily newspapers between generalist, sport, and financial. We
incorporate information on multi-homing by readers by allowing them to choose between bundles of
newspapers. We show that not accounting for multi-homing leads to a substantial bias in the estimation
of own- and cross-price elasticities on the readers’ side of the market. In particular, own-price elasticities
are larger when readers’ multi-homing is taken into account. Allowing for multi-homing recognizes that,
when the price of one newspaper rises, those readers that actually multi-home on that newspaper may
have more and closer substitute bundles to switch to with respect to when they are assumed to single-
home. Thus, readers may turn out to be more price-sensitive when their multi-homing is taken into
account. Furthermore, while newspapers are assumed to be substitutes in the single-homing model, they
can be substitutes or complements when multi-homing by readers is taken into account. Indeed, we find
that while newspapers of the same type are substitutes, newspapers of different types are complements.
We also show the importance of allowing for multi-homing readers on the advertising side of the
market. Our model of advertising demand allows newspapers to be closer substitutes for advertisers,
the more similar they are in terms of reader characteristics, including multi-homing behavior. First, we
find that advertisers are more price-sensitive when we account for readers’ multi-homing. This is due to
the fact that they can reach the same reader through more than one newspaper. Moreover, advertisers’
demand is less elastic for newspapers that have a higher share of captive readers, which is consistent with
the fact that newspapers offer exclusive access to these readers. In addition, we find that newspapers are
closer substitutes for advertisers if they have a higher share of readers in common. When reaching
readers in a newspaper becomes more expensive, advertisers will not advertise or advertise less to them
in that newspaper and advertise more in other newspapers that those readers buy. Moreover, we find that
two of our newspapers are kind of "must-have" for advertisers: if they decide to advertise in national
print newspapers, then they first place ads in these two newspapers. This feature is due to their higher
circulation and number of captive readers, thus making these outlets more valuable to advertisers.
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1 Introduction
Two-sided markets are markets in which firms sell two products or services to two different types of
consumers, taking into account that the two demands are linked by indirect network effects. Examples
of such markets are media markets, where demand for advertising is related to the size of the audience,
and the market for online social networks, where advertising demand depends on the number of users.
A media firm typically operates in a two-sided market as it sells content to readers/viewers and
advertising space to advertisers. Moreover, it knows that the size (and possibly the characteristics) of
the audience influences the demand for advertising space and, vice versa, the amount (or concentration)
of advertising might influence the audience’s demand. In other words, a media company recognizes
the existence of indirect network effects between the two sides of the market when making its strategic
decisions.
With the emergence of digital technologies, multi-homing has become a widespread phenomenon
in media markets. In fact, the cost of multi-homing for consumers of media content has dramatically
dropped. For instance, newspaper readers can now access multiple online news outlets with just a few
clicks, no longer needing to buy and carry a pile of different newspapers, then physically leafing through
them. Similarly, TV viewers now have access to many more digital channels. Thus, effectively con-
sumers more frequently multi-home.1
Hence, advertisers are now able to reach consumers over a greater number of outlets during their
preferred time period (whether a day, a week, or a month). This has implications for the willingness of
advertisers to pay for reaching consumers. For instance, considering the extreme case in which an ad-
vertiser wishes to reach its target consumers on newspapers only once, the value of second impressions
would be zero. In such a case, a merger between newspapers read by two distinct sets of readers (i.e.,
whose readers single-home) could have very different effects on the prices charged to advertisers than
a merger of newspapers with perfectly overlapping readers (i.e., whose readers multi-home). Thus, al-
lowing for multi-homing is crucial when devising policy decisions, whether in assessing mergers among
media outlets, in regulating cross-ownership of media, or in setting advertising limits.
We empirically study the role of multi-homing in two-sided markets. First, we build a micro-founded
structural econometric model, encompassing demand for differentiated products on both sides of the
market and allowing for multi-homing on each side. We then estimate the model using data covering
Italian daily newspapers, alternatively taking into account and not taking into account information on
multi-homing by readers. Readers’ demand is estimated using a nested logit model, where the structure
of the nests draws on the traditional classification of national daily newspapers between generalist, sport,
and financial. We incorporate information on multi-homing by readers by allowing them to choose
between bundles of newspapers. We show that not accounting for multi-homing leads to a substantial
bias in the estimation of own- and cross-price elasticities on the readers’ side of the market. In particular,
own-price elasticities are larger when readers’ multi-homing is taken into account.
Allowing for multi-homing recognizes that, when the price of one newspaper rises, those readers that
actually multi-home on that newspaper may have more and closer substitute bundles to switch to with
respect to when they are assumed to single-home. Thus, readers may turn out to be more price-sensitive
1For evidence on multi-homing in online markets, see Ambrus, Calvano, and Reisinger (2016), p. 190.
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when their multi-homing is taken into account.
Furthermore, while newspapers are assumed to be substitutes in the single-homing model, they can
be substitutes or complements when multi-homing by readers is taken into account. Indeed, we find that
while newspapers of the same type are substitutes, newspapers of different types are complements.
We also show the importance of allowing for multi-homing readers on the advertising side of the mar-
ket. Our model of advertising demand captures the idea that advertisers first decide on an overall budget
to spend on advertising in national print newspapers, then decide how to allocate this budget across news-
papers depending on prices and circulation. The model allows newspapers to be closer substitutes for
advertisers, the more similar they are in terms of reader characteristics, including multi-homing behav-
ior. First, we find that advertisers are more price-sensitive when we account for readers’ multi-homing.
This is due to the fact that they can reach the same reader through more than one newspaper. Moreover,
advertisers’ demand is less elastic for newspapers that have a higher share of captive readers, which
is consistent with the fact that the newspapers offer exclusive access to these readers. In addition, we
find that newspapers are closer substitutes for advertisers if they have a higher share of readers in com-
mon. When reaching readers in a newspaper becomes more expensive, advertisers will not advertise or
advertise less to them in that newspaper and advertise more in other newspapers that those readers buy.
Moreover, we find that two of our newspaper are kind of "must-have" for advertisers: if they decide
to advertise in national print newspapers, then they first place ads in these two newspapers. This feature
is due to their higher circulation and number of captive readers, thus making these outlets more valuable
to advertisers. Finally, our model also delivers interesting insights into the pattern of substitutability
between newspapers from the perspective of advertisers. The standard substitution effect can be out-
weighed by a budget effect, leading to negative cross-price elasticities. This is due to the high elasticity
of the budget for advertising in national newspapers, which is consistent with them as a whole being
subject to substantial competitive pressure from other advertising outlets.
Our paper contributes to the economic literature on two-sided markets, in which empirical work
accounting for multi-homing on both sides of the market is still quite scarce (see next section for a
discussion). As discussed below, our results are related to the predictions of the theoretical literature on
two-sided markets, in particular to those accounting for multi-homing. Moreover, our contribution allows
for a better understanding of the implications of multi-homing and, therefore, is useful for competition
and regulation authorities seeking to improve their quantitative assessment in cases involving two-sided
platforms. Although print newspapers are a classic example of an offline two-sided market, our empirical
model should be seen as an approach to studying the role of multi-homing in (non-transaction) platform
markets. The methodology can also be applied to other two-sided markets for which data on user multi-
homing is available. In light of the prevalence and rising importance of multi-sided platforms in digital
markets and the pervasiveness of multi-homing by users on online platforms, the results and conclusions
from this paper are also relevant in the context of competition policy cases involving online multi-sided
platforms.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature on multi-homing in two-sided
markets. Section 3 provides an overview of the market for daily newspapers in Italy and the data we
use. Section 4 presents a two-sided model of demand allowing for multi-homing on both sides, while we
discuss estimation results in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Multi-Homing in Two-Sided Markets
Following the seminal works of Caillaud and Jullien (2001, 2003), Rochet and Tirole (2002, 2003, 2006),
Parker and van Alstyne (2005), and Armstrong (2006), a growing number of papers address the the-
oretical aspects of two-sided markets, such as Anderson and Gabszewicz (2006) on media markets.
Some, including Evans (2003), Wright (2004), Evans and Schmalensee (2007), Filistrucchi, Klein, and
Michielsen (2012), and Filistrucchi, Geradin, Van Damme, and Affeldt (2014) focus on competition
policy in two-sided markets.
So far, most of the theoretical literature on two-sided markets assumes single-homing on at least
one side of the market, most often on the readers’/viewers’ side in media markets. In this context, the
competitive bottleneck problem of Armstrong (2006) arises, whereby each media outlet is a monopolist
over providing access to its exclusive audience and, thus, advertisers must patronize all of them in order
to reach all consumers. As discussed in Anderson and Jullien (2015), the theoretical literature has started
filling this gap, e.g. Ambrus, Calvano, and Reisinger (2016), Anderson, Foros, and Kind (2018), Athey,
Calvano, and Gans (2018), Jeitschko and Tremblay (2020), and Bakos and Halaburda (2020).
The fact that a fraction of consumers patronizes more than one platform changes the model predic-
tions quite dramatically. If advertisers can reach multi-homing consumers on more than one platform,
media outlets no longer only compete for consumers on the audience side of the market but also compete
for advertisers on the advertising side of the market. In particular, it turns out that "each platform is
able to price to advertisers only the value of its exclusive consumers plus the incremental value associ-
ated with multi-homing (shared) consumers" (Anderson, Foros, and Kind (2018), p. 35). This so-called
"principle of incremental pricing" has important implications for platforms’ strategies in terms of pricing,
reaction to mergers, and content provision. Our findings are related to some of the empirical predictions
of this literature. In particular, our finding that advertisers are more price-sensitive when we account
for readers’ multi-homing is consistent with the theoretical finding that advertising prices decrease as
multi-homing increases (see Athey, Calvano, and Gans (2018) and Jeitschko and Tremblay (2020)).
Moreover, our result on the existence of some newspapers that are "must-have" for advertisers based
on their large circulation, but also on their share of captive readers, might be explained with the result
of Athey, Calvano, and Gans (2018) that "because duplicated ad impressions are avoided within a pub-
lisher, placing ads on only the larger publisher involves less expected waste than when you place ads on
the smaller publisher or spread them across publishers." (Athey, Calvano, and Gans (2018), p. 1581).
Finally, we confirm the finding of Ambrus, Calvano, and Reisinger (2016) that it is not just the size, but
also the composition of the audience that matters. Indeed, our results suggest that the share of captive
versus overlapping readers is a key determinant of advertising prices, which may again be related to the
incremental pricing principle.
Despite the considerable number of theoretical contributions, empirical work is lagging behind in
accounting for multi-homing. Starting from the seminal papers of Rysman (2004) on the market for yel-
low pages and Kaiser and Wright (2006) on the German magazine market, most empirical contributions
assume single-homing on at least one side of the market, typically the audience side. For example Fil-
istrucchi, Klein, and Michielsen (2012) and Affeldt, Filistrucchi, and Klein (2013), while using data on
the Dutch daily newspaper market to simulate the unilateral effects of mergers, do not allow for multi-
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homing; similarly for Filistrucchi and Klein (2013). Ivaldi and Muller-Vibes (2018) estimate a two-sided
nested logit model of demand for the print media industry in France, but lack information on readers’
multi-homing behavior. Song (2021) builds a two-sided model of demand and estimates it on a dataset of
TV magazines to show the impact of mergers on the pricing structure and on consumer welfare. Like in
our case, readers’ demand is modelled with a nested logit. However, readers are assumed to single-home.
While Rysman (2007) shows that multi-homing in adoption, but not in usage, is an important feature
of the payment card market, Fan (2013) moves a step forward by allowing each household to buy up to
two newspapers in the econometric model. Yet, Fan (2013) lacks information on double-readership of
newspapers at the household level and, therefore, does not use this information in the estimation. We
do have this information at the individual newspaper level and use it to analyze the impact of allowing
for multi-homing readers on the empirical results. Gentzkow (2007) develops a methodology that allows
for the consumption of two products in order to study competition between print and online newspapers.
The same demand model is also applied by Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Sinkinson (2014), who show that ad-
vertising competition leads to increased ideological diversity, and by Grzybowski and Verboven (2016),
who study substitution between fixed-line and mobile voice access. Unlike Gentzkow (2007), which has
individual-level data on readership for a small set of newspapers, we have aggregate data for a larger set
of newspapers. Thus, we build a nested logit demand model encompassing the multi-homing of readers
by allowing them to choose between bundles of newspapers. With respect to Gentzkow, Shapiro, and
Sinkinson (2014), who also analyze the implications of readers’ overlap for advertising-market com-
petition, we have more precise information on readership duplication, whereas it is calibrated in their
model. Moreover, unlike them, we allow for network effects from advertisers to readers and for readers’
heterogeneity. Both Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Sinkinson (2014) and Fan (2013) restrict the products to
be substitutes, whereas our model allows for complementarity.Further, Shi (2015) accounts for readers’
multi-homing in the estimation of demand for U.S. magazines, finding that advertising prices are related
to the share of exclusive versus overlapping readers. However, he has data on readers’ multi-homing
just for one period, while we have much richer survey data including bi-annual information from 1992
through 2006. A paper by Liu (2018) estimates the effect of consumer multi-homing on prices in the
online advertising market. Ivaldi and Zhang (2021) instead build a model that allows for advertisers’
multi-homing and use it to simulate the effect of mergers between digital television platforms.
This paper builds on Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007), where the authors test for market power in
the national daily newspaper market in Italy. However, that paper, lacking information on multi-homing,
assumes that readers do not multi-home, i.e., that they read only one newspaper. Both the structural
econometric model and the estimation are conducted under this assumption. Moreover, the analysis is
conducted on a smaller sample of newspapers (i.e., only the national generalist newspapers) and over a
shorter time. Finally, their dataset on the advertising side of the market is much less detailed than the one
we use in this paper.
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3 Data
The dataset contains information on seven national daily Italian newspapers, belonging to three different
categories: general interest, sport, and financial newspapers.2 The four general interest newspapers are
Corriere della Sera, La Repubblica, La Stampa, and Il Giornale. The two sport newspapers are Corriere
dello Sport and Gazzetta dello Sport. The financial newspaper is Il Sole 24 Ore. In December 2006, at
the end of our sample period, these seven newspapers accounted for more than 40% of overall circulation
of daily newspapers in Italy.3 In the sub-market of general interest newspapers, Corriere della Sera and
La Repubblica were, and still are, the largest players in terms of circulation. Other newspapers are not
included in our dataset because their circulation is mainly regional (e.g. Il Messaggero or QN) or much
smaller than those in our sample (e.g. Avvenire). As for sport newspapers, Gazzetta dello Sport and
Corriere dello Sport are the largest outlets, with more than 80% of copies in this segment. Finally, Il
Sole 24 Ore is by far the main financial paper, retaining more than 80% of the market segment in terms
of copies sold.
On the readers’ side, the dataset features monthly observations for each newspaper on each day of
the week from 1992 through 2006. Thus, the dataset contains seven observations per month for each
newspaper, from the average Monday to the average Sunday in a given month. Market-level data on
circulation comes from those collected for advertising purposes by Accertamenti Diffusione Stampa
(ADS).4 Specifically, we use monthly average printed copies for each day of the week as a proxy for
circulation, since information on the number of copies sold on each day of the week is not available in
this dataset. Indeed, it is important to have information disaggregated by day of the week because some
weekly supplements are bundled with the newspapers only on some days of the week and cover prices
vary by day of the week. We collected information from newspaper publishers on the cover prices of
the newspapers and on content characteristics such as the dates regular supplements were introduced,
the changes of editors, the presence of local news sections, and the dates newspapers’ websites were
established.
Information on multi-homing by readers (i.e. on how many readers of a given newspaper also read
each of the other newspapers) is collected, for advertising purposes, by Audipress in bi-annual surveys.5
In particular, the survey asks readers which newspapers they read on an average day. Then, for each
newspaper, it computes the number of readers that read only that newspaper as well as the number of
readers that also read each of the other newspapers. However, we do not know whether readers of
that newspaper, who also read another newspaper, overlap with readers of a third newspaper. Thus, we
only refer to double-homing in the following as we cannot identify those readers who read more than
two newspapers from the data. Note that, to the extent that they do not carry out additional surveys
themselves, this information comprises all that advertisers know about single-homing or multi-homing
by readers.
2This segmentation of the newspaper market has been adopted in several antitrust decisions, both in Italy and across the
European Union. See, for instance, Italian case 3354/95 Ballarino vs. Grandi Quotidiani and the European Commission’s
decisions M.3817 Wegener/PCM/JV and M.1401 Recoletos/Unedisa.




Table 1 shows, by newspaper, the percentage of single- and double-homing readers. Depending
on the newspaper, an average of between 25% and 62% of the readers single-home, i.e., buy only this
specific newspaper. Whether readers single-home or double-home also seems to depend on the type of
newspaper: while many readers single-home on a general interest newspaper, only 25% of the readers of
the financial newspaper Il Sole 24 Ore single-home. The Table also shows on which newspapers readers
double-home. Thus, the second line shows that, on average, 14.9% and 14.8% of Corriere’s readers
also buy Gazzetta dello Sport and La Repubblica, respectively. The sixth line shows that 21% of Il
Sole 24 Ore readers also read Corriere della Sera or La Repubblica. Figure 1 represents the information
on the percentage of readers single- and double-homing graphically. There is one column for each
newspaper. The dark-blue area at the bottom of each column represents the percentage of single-homing
readers, while all colored areas above it represent the percentage of multi-homing of readers of the given
newspapers on each of the other newspapers.























Corriere 45.8 . 4.4 14.9 5.8 14.8 10.2 4.1
Corriere Sport 41.5 7.8 . 29.5 3 10.8 4.5 3.1
Gazzetta Sport 50.1 13.1 14.7 . 3.5 8.7 5 4.9
Giornale 29 20.4 5.9 13.8 . 12 12 6.9
Repubblica 51.4 14.6 6.1 9.7 3.3 . 9.7 5.3
Il Sole 25 21.4 5.3 11.9 7.1 20.6 . 8.6
Stampa 61.6 6.9 2.9 9.5 3.3 8.9 6.9 .
We report the mean percentage of readers single-homing and double-homing over the years 1992-2006.
On the advertisers’ side of the market, the dataset contains market-level data on advertising quantity,
prices, and reader characteristics of those same newspapers, with monthly observations for each different
day of the week from 1992 through 2006. Data on advertising quantities and advertising prices net of
discounts come from the database of Nielsen Media Research,6 while data on readers’ demographics
come from those collected by Audipress. The latter data are collected bi-annually.
Information on the total number of (advertising and non-advertising) pages per newspaper also comes
from Nielsen Media Research, while information on the size of a newspaper was collected browsing on
the internet. In combination with information on the price of the paper used to print daily newspapers,
collected from Camera di Commercio di Milano, this data allows us to calculate the paper input cost per
page and per printed copy.
Table 2 presents summary statistics on the variables we use in the estimation of the readers’ side of
the market. The average daily circulation of the newspapers included in the dataset is about 560,000
copies, while the mean real cover price over the sample period is about 0.96 Euros per copy.
6Advertising price does not include advertising in supplements but only in the newspaper itself.
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Double-homing Corriere Sport Double-homing Gazzetta Sport
Double-homing Giornale Double-homing Il Sole
Double-homing Repubblica Double-homing Stampa
We report the mean percentage of readers single-homing and double-homing over the years 1992-2006.
Table 3 presents instead summary statistics for the variables we use in the estimation of the advertis-
ing side of the market. While the mean advertising expenditure share is 14%, the average real advertising
price is about 180 Euros per advertising slot.
Importantly, the variable "captive readers" measures the percentage of single-homing readers for each
newspaper. This measure is crucial in order to properly account for multi-homing by readers: the more
readers single-home, the higher the market power of the newspaper on the advertising side of the market,
as newspapers enjoy monopoly power over providing access to these captive readers (see Armstrong,
2006).
Hence, the final datasets both on the reader side as well as on the advertising side of the market cover
monthly observations for each different day of the week for the seven newspapers from January 1992
through December 2006. Appendix A.1 contains a list of all the variables used in our empirical analyses
together with the corresponding data sources.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics Reader Side (1992-2006)
mean sd min max
Average newspaper’s prints (10k) 56.76 20.19 21.12 127.43
Market share (%) 1.14 0.41 0.43 2.60
Real cover price (EUR/copy) 0.96 0.12 0.79 1.60
Number of pages 40.43 13.00 16.50 115.00
Number of advertising slots (k) 0.94 0.51 0.05 3.34
Advertising intensity (slots/pages) 22.58 8.23 1.81 51.99
Generalist magazine 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00
Generalist magazine (day) 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00
Women magazine 0.21 0.40 0.00 1.00
Women magazine (day) 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00
Economic insert 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00
Economic insert (day) 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00
Local pages 5.45 5.64 0.00 22.00
Website 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00
Real paper cost (EUR/copy) 0.11 0.04 0.04 0.32
Observations 8795
Table 3: Summary Statistics Advertiser Side (1992-2006)
mean sd min max
Advertising expenditure share (%) 14.33 10.18 0.36 51.05
Real advertising slot price (k EUR) 0.18 0.09 0.03 0.59
Percentage of readers between 14 and 17 4.76 2.88 0.84 12.87
Percentage of readers between 18 and 24 13.03 4.23 5.40 21.68
Percentage of readers between 25 and 34 21.51 3.23 15.90 30.40
Percentage of readers between 35 and 44 19.45 2.78 13.70 26.60
Percentage of readers between 45 and 54 17.36 2.59 11.78 23.40
Percentage of readers between 55 and 64 12.57 2.57 7.30 18.83
Percentage of readers above 65 11.31 4.91 3.20 23.60
Percentage of readers in low income group 12.71 7.27 2.90 32.20
Percentage of readers in middle income group 61.36 4.88 49.25 72.20
Percentage of readers in high income group 25.93 9.92 9.03 46.60
Percentage of female readers 31.64 12.27 9.00 46.50
Percentage of captive readers 43.47 12.81 9.49 66.50
Observations 8795
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4 A Model of Demand
The structural econometric model encompasses demand for differentiated products on both sides of the
market and allows for multi-homing on each side of the market. We estimate both readers’ demand
and advertisers’ demand taking into account the inter-market network effects that characterize two-sided
markets.
On the readers’ side of the market, demand derives from random utility maximization by readers
and is estimated using a nested logit model, as in Berry (1994). The structure of the nests draws on the
traditional classification of national daily newspapers into generalist, sport, and financial. On this side of
the market, we have information on multi-homing. When taking into account this information, readers
are allowed to choose between all possible newspaper-pairings and nests are designed accordingly as
pairs of newspapers of the same or of different categories.
On the advertisers’ side of the market, demand derives from advertisers’ choice to allocate a given
advertising budget, which is affected by the business cycle, across different newspapers. This is similar
to consumers allocating a given budget among different types of beers as in Hausman, Leonard, and Zona
(1994). Product differentiation is interpreted in the spatial sense proposed by Pinkse, Slade, and Brett
(2002), as applied parametrically in Slade (2004) and in Pinkse and Slade (2004). Hence, cross-price
elasticities among two products (in our case advertising slots in two different newspapers) are assumed
to be a function of the distance among the products in characteristic space, so that cross-price elasticities
would be higher when products are closer to each other in terms of characteristics. In our application,
the distance metrics are derived from differences among newspapers in the demographic characteristics
of readers. In addition, own-price effects are allowed to depend on readers’ characteristics. While our
model also allows for advertisers to multi-home, we do not have, and hence do not use, data on multi-
homing by advertisers. However, consistently with the theoretical models of two-sided markets, the
information on multi-homing by readers can be used also in the estimation of advertising demand. In
particular, we derive distance metrics from the number of overlapping readers between two newspapers,
and the number of captive readers is considered as an additional newspaper characteristic from the point
of view of advertisers. Finally, in applying the distance metrics model to a two-sided market such as the
newspaper market, we allow advertising demand on a newspaper to depend on its circulation.
4.1 Readers’ Demand
On the readers’ side of the market, demand derives from random utility maximization by readers and is
estimated using a nested logit model as in Berry (1994).7 Hence, reader i at time t on weekday d chooses
one unit of newspaper j ∈ J to maximize utility
ui jtd = α p jtd +βx jtd + γa jtd +ξ jtd +ζgtd +(1−σ)εi jtd , (1)
where p jtd is the real cover price of newspaper j at time t on weekday d, x jtd is a set of observed
newspaper characteristics, a jtd is the advertising intensity in newspaper j at time t on weekday d (mea-
7We also estimated a random coefficient logit model. However, the random coefficient for the cover price is not estimated
to be significant. Further, Fan (2013) also finds that consumer heterogeneity in price sensitivity is very small and statistically
insignificant. Therefore, she also refrains from estimating a random coefficient on newspaper subscription price.
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sured as advertising slots per page), ξ jtd is an unobserved (by the econometrician) product characteristic,
ζgtd represents consumer utility common to all newspapers of nest g at time t on weekday d, and εi jtd
is an idiosyncratic error term assumed to be i.i.d. extreme value type 1. σ measures the correlation of
unobserved utility between newspapers within nests relative to the between ones. As σ approaches one,
newspapers within a nest approach being perfect substitutes, if σ is instead equal to zero, the correlation
of unobserved utility within nests is zero and we are back to the simple logit case.
The structure of the nests draws on the traditional classification of national daily newspapers into
generalist, sport, and financial newspapers. As discussed in Section 3, we have data on four general
interest newspapers, two sport newspapers, and one financial newspaper. Figure 2 in Appendix A.3
shows the structure of the nests under the single-homing assumption.
The resulting baseline estimation equation of the nested logit model is the following:
ln(s jtd)− ln(s0td) = α p jtd +βx jtd + γa jtd +σ ln(s jtd|g)+φ jd + τtg +ν jtd , (2)
where s jtd is the market share of newspaper j at time t on weekday d, s0td is the market share of the
outside good, p jtd is the newspaper’s cover price, x jtd is a set of observed newspaper characteristics, a jtd
is the advertising intensity in newspaper j, and s jtd|g is the share of newspaper j within nest g. We split
the unobserved product characteristic ξ jtd into the newspaper-weekday fixed effect φ jd , the time fixed
effects τtg, and the i.i.d. error term ν jtd .
The newspaper-weekday fixed effects capture the unobserved product characteristics that are con-
stant over time. The time fixed effects, specific to each nest, capture variations in time in the relative
attractiveness of the outside good with respect to the different categories of newspapers in our sample
(for instance because of the appearance of internet, which is here allowed to have differential effects on
sales of sport, business, and generalist newspapers). We further control for seasonality (see Section 5 for
details). The market shares are defined over the total potential market size, which is considered to be the
total population in Italy older than 14 years, as is usual in studies on media markets.
The newspaper cover price, the advertising intensity, as well as the within nest market share are
all endogenous as they might be correlated with the unobserved product characteristic ξ jtd . Following
Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) and Nevo (2000), we use the sum of the characteristics of the other
newspapers as instruments for the newspaper cover price (so called ’BLP instruments’). Specifically,
we use the dummy variables for the weekday when a supplement is bundled to the newspaper, when
a women magazine is bundled to the newspaper, as well as the number of local pages to construct the
BLP instruments for newspaper cover price. The within nest market share is instrumented with the
corresponding BLP instruments within a given nest. As described in Section 3, we also construct a
marginal cost measure, the real paper cost per copy, which varies over newspapers and over time, that
is used as an instrument for cover price and advertising intensity. The reasoning behind the use of this
instrument is that if the paper cost per issue increases, the cover price increases, thus readers decrease.
The newspaper then increases the advertising intensity by decreasing the ad price.8 Lastly, we use
Italian GDP to instrument advertising intensity, as GDP is a measure of the overall business cycle and
advertising expenditures by companies increase with the business cycle, whereas, given the low price for
8Indeed, in the first stage for advertising intensity, the cost per issue is positive and significant.
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a copy of a newspaper, income effects from the business cycle are not expected to be substantial and not
to directly affect readers’ demand.9
We aim to investigate the bias that can take place in the estimation of demand parameters, in partic-
ular price elasticities and indirect network effects, when neglecting readers’ multi-homing. In order to
assess the relevance of this bias, we estimate two different specifications of readers’ demand. The tradi-
tional demand equation (similar to Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007)) assumes that readers only read one
newspaper in each period, i.e. all readers single-home. Therefore, we estimate the nested logit model at
the newspaper level: j in equations (1) and (2) refers to a newspaper. We also estimate a second, alterna-
tive demand equation where readers are allowed to read up to two newspapers (which is what we observe
in the data). Thus, we model readers as choosing between all possible newspaper-pairings (including
single-homing on a newspaper) and estimate readers’ demand at the bundle level.10 This implies that j
in equations (1) and (2) now refers to a bundle of up to two newspapers. Nests are accordingly designed
at the bundle level. Consistent with the structure of nests under the single-homing assumption, under the
double-homing assumption we distinguish six nests, comprising respectively: general interest newspaper
bundles, sport newspaper bundles, financial newspaper bundles, general interest/sport bundles, general
interest/financial bundles, and sport/financial bundles. Figure 3 in Appendix A.3 shows the structure of
the nests under the double-homing assumption.
Estimating the nested logit discrete choice model at the bundle level relaxes the strong assumption
of all newspapers being substitutes. While a discrete choice model at the bundle level still assumes that
newspaper bundles are substitutes, individual newspapers can be complements rather than substitutes.11
The own-price elasticity of demand η j j in the nested logit model is given by (for α > 0):







p jt [1− (1−σ)s jt −σs jt|g] (3)







α pkt [skt + σ1−σ skt|g] if k 6= j and k ∈ gα pktskt if k 6= j and k /∈ g (4)
Note that, when readers’ demand is estimated at the bundle level, the above elasticity formulas give
the own-price and cross-price elasticities at the bundle rather than at the newspaper level. However, we
are ultimately interested in the elasticities at the newspaper level. Hence, when computing elasticities,
we first compute the marginal effects at the bundle level, sum up all the relevant marginal effects at the
bundle level to get to the marginal effects at the newspaper level, and then multiply these marginal effects
9See for example van der Wurff, Bakker, and Picard (2008) for an empirical study on the link between economic growth,
measured by GDP, and advertising intensity and expenditures for different media and in different industrialized countries.
In particular, the results show that advertising expenditures in newspapers respond, relatively closely, to economic change,
while the link is weaker for TV, radio, and cinema. The paper also contains a comprehensive review of the existing literature
establishing the relationship between advertising spending and economic growth.
10Thus, we construct a second dataset based on the data on multi-homing behavior of readers, in which the level of observa-
tion is no longer a newspaper but a bundle of up to two newspapers for a given weekday and month. Appendix A.2 contains
a detailed description of how we construct the dataset at the bundle level based on the newspaper level data and on the survey
information on multi-homing by readers.
11In particular, as the utility is parametrized at the bundle level, the ΓAB in Gentzkow (2007), which determines whether
goods A and B are substitutes or complements, can be negative or positive. However, we do not estimate the Γs explicitly.
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with the respective newspaper price (own or cross) and divide by the newspaper’s market share to obtain
the elasticities at the newspaper level.
4.2 Advertisers’ Demand
On the advertisers’ side of the market, we depart from the modeling choices of the previous literature.
Many papers use very stylized models on the advertising side of the market. For example, Argentesi
and Filistrucchi (2007) use a logit model for advertisers’ demand, which assumes that advertisers make
the discrete choice of placing ads in one newspaper only. Secondly, in this model, substitution between
newspapers is proportional to newspapers’ market shares. Other studies, such as for example Rysman
(2004) or Shi (2015), estimate inverse advertising demand, where advertising price is a function of
advertising quantity, the number of readers (potentially distinguishing captive and multi-homing readers)
and fixed effects. However, this assumes that advertising in different newspapers are independent goods
for advertisers.
Our model of advertising demand tries to capture the following ideas of how advertising demand
works in practice: advertisers first decide on an overall budget to spend on advertising in national print
newspapers (relative to other channels). They then decide how to allocate this budget across newspapers
depending on the respective advertising prices and circulation of newspapers.12 Thus, advertisers’ de-
mand is continuous and advertisers can multi-home: they decide how many advertising slots to buy in
each newspaper and they can potentially advertise in all newspapers at the same time. Lastly, the model
tries to capture the idea that newspapers are closer substitutes for advertisers, the more similar these
newspapers are in terms of reader characteristics.
Although our empirical specification of advertisers’ demand is somewhat targeted to our specific
context, it is still relevant for online platforms. Even in an online context, it is likely that advertisers
first set a budget for online advertising and then decide how to split the budget across outlets. Further-
more, how close substitutes outlets are from an advertiser’s view should be a function of viewers/readers
reached via the different outlets. Even though one would expect that, in an online context, more so-
phisticated consumer characteristics matter for advertising, actually the most popular digital information
bought by the majority of advertisers is basic demographic data on age and gender (Neumann, Tucker,
and Whitfield, 2019).
Thus, on the advertisers’ side of the market, demand derives from advertisers’ choice to allocate
a given budget, which changes with the business cycle, across different media outlets. This approach
follows Hausman, Leonard, and Zona (1994), who model consumer choices among different brands of
beer. Product differentiation is interpreted in the spatial sense proposed by Pinkse, Slade, and Brett
(2002), as applied parametrically in Slade (2004) and in Pinkse and Slade (2004). The basic idea is that
cross-price elasticities among two products (in our case advertising slots in two different newspapers)
should be a function of the distance among the products in characteristic space. One would then expect
higher cross-price elasticities when products are closer to each other in terms of characteristics. In
addition, own-price effects are allowed to depend on characteristics of the newspapers. In our case,
12We abstract from the role of intermediaries, assuming that the advertising agencies act in the interest of advertisers and,
therefore, base their choices on price and circulation.
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the distance metrics are derived from differences among newspapers in the demographic characteristics
of readers (e.g., age, gender, income) and from the number of overlapping readers between the two
newspapers, while the own-price elasticities are allowed to depend on the number of captive readers.
As required by the two-sidedness of the media market, we allow advertising demand on a newspaper
to depend on its circulation. In the demand specification, the circulation of the newspapers is treated
the same way product advertising is treated in Rojas (2008) and Rojas and Peterson (2008), by allowing
own-circulation effects to depend on product characteristics and cross-circulation effects to depend on
the distance between newspapers in characteristic space.
Following Hausman, Leonard, and Zona (1994), advertising demand is estimated using demand
equations at different levels. At the top level, advertisers decide on a budget to spend on advertising in
our set of national print newspapers (relative to advertising via other channels). The estimation equation
of overall demand for advertising space on national newspapers is the following:
ln(qtd) = β0 +β1 ln(yt)+β2 ln(Ptd)+φZtd + εtd , (5)
where qtd is total advertising quantity (measured in advertising slots) at time t on weekday d, yt is
GDP at time t, Ptd is a deflated price index for advertising in newspapers at time t on weekday d (see
explanation on the price index below), Ztd is a set of time and seasonal controls, potentially different by
weekday, and εtd is an i.i.d. error term varying across time and weekday. Hence, the coefficient β2 on
the price index for advertising in newspapers is the overall price elasticity of advertising demand in these
seven newspapers relative to other media outlets.
The endogenous advertising price index Ptd is instrumented by printing cost shifters, in particular the
average real paper cost per page (averaged across the seven newspapers), an electricity price index for
industrial consumers,13 and an hourly wage index for the printed media sector.
At the newspaper level, advertisers decide in a second step on how to allocate their newspaper ad-
vertising budget chosen at the top level across the seven newspapers. Thus, advertisers are allowed to
multi-home and can potentially decide to buy (different amounts of) advertising space in all of the seven
newspapers at the same time.
Following Rojas (2008) and Rojas and Peterson (2008), we use a linear approximation of the Almost
Ideal Demand System by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) to model newspaper level advertising demand.
The estimation equation of demand for advertising space in a particular newspaper is then:








c jkt ln(circktd)+d j ln(
xtd
Ptd
)+ ε jtd , (6)




). The term f jtd can incorporate time and newspaper dummy variables, newspaper charac-
teristics and market-specific variables such as demographics. pktd is the real price per advertising slot in
newspaper k at time t on weekday d, circktd is the circulation of newspaper k at time t on weekday d, xtd
is total advertising expenditures at time t on weekday d (i.e. xtd = ∑Jj=1 p jtdq jtd), and Ptd is an overall
13series nrg_pc_205_h, consumption band Ie from Eurostat.
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advertising price index.14 Rojas and Peterson (2008) use a Laspeyres index for the overall advertising
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d=1 w jtd . However, in our dataset, some of the newspapers are not available on all
weekdays in the earlier years of the data. Using the base share w0j of newspapers to compute the overall
advertising price index would, thus, artificially understate the price index for those weekday observa-
tions when not all seven newspapers are available. Therefore, we use the Stone price index to measure
the overall advertising price instead, defined as ln(Ptd) = ∑Jj=1 w jtd ln(p jtd), as has been proposed by
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) and often applied in practice. The term ln( xtdPtd ) enters the estimation
equation as the advertising sales shares are conditional on the total advertising expenditures xtd set at the
top level, i.e. holding total advertising expenditures xtd constant.
Equation (6) is a first-order approximation in prices and circulation to a demand function allowing
for unrestricted price and circulation parameters. In order to reduce the number of cross-price and cross-
circulation coefficients that need to be estimated, following Slade (2004) and Pinkse and Slade (2004),
we model the cross-price and cross-circulation coefficients b jkt and c jkt as linear functions of distance
measures between newspapers j and k. In particular, how close substitutes two newspapers are in the eyes
of advertisers depends on how close these two newspapers are in characteristics space. The closeness
metrics are derived from differences among newspapers in the demographic characteristics of readers
(age, gender, income) and the number of overlapping readers between the two newspapers.
Thus, the estimation equation becomes:




























Where δ jkt and µ jkt are the L and M closeness measures that determine the cross-price and cross-
circulation effects, respectively, while λl and τm are parameters to be estimated.
Substituting (8) and (9) into (7) and regrouping terms, the estimation equation is given by:

























14On the readers’ side of the market, we include advertising in readers’ demand as advertising intensity a jtd . Advertising
intensity is defined as the number of advertising slots divided by the number of pages of newspaper j at time t on weekday d.
This relates to the advertising sales share w jtd as this share is defined as advertising expenditures on newspaper j divided by
total advertising expenditures xtd at time t on weekday d, where expenditures are price times quantity and advertising quantity
is measured in advertising slots. Newspaper circulation included in advertisers’ demand relates to the readers’ demand market




The closeness measures between newspapers for continuous product characteristics use an inverse
measure of Euclidean distance.15 These closeness measures between two newspapers vary between zero
and one, so that a one implies that the two newspapers are at the same location in characteristic space.
For discrete closeness measures (for example the type of newspaper: generalist, sport, financial), the
closeness between two newspapers is equal to one if they belong to the same group (i.e., are of the
same type) and zero otherwise. The cross-price and cross-circulation coefficients b jkt and c jkt are then
recovered by replacing the estimated coefficients λl and τm and the closeness measures δ jkt and µ jkt into
(8) and (9), respectively. See Appendix A.4 for further details on the computation of closeness measures.
Note that also the own-price and own-circulation coefficients b j jt and c j jt can be modeled as func-
tions of newspaper j’s own product characteristics. For example, using the percentage of female read-
ers as the relevant product characteristic, the own-price coefficient in (8) would be defined as b j jt =
b1 + b2 f emalereaders jt , where f emalereaders jt is the percentage of female readers of newspaper j at
time t.
Since we specifically aim to investigate the effect of reader multi-homing on the estimation of de-
mand parameters on both sides of the market, we model the own-price effects as a function of the percent-
age of captive readers a newspaper has and the cross-price effects as a function of the overlap in readers
between two newspapers. Like the estimation of readers’ demand, we estimate two specifications, one
disregarding multi-homing information, such as the percentage of captive readers or the percentage of
overlapping readers, and one using this information. Note that we treat the number of captive and joint
readers as exogenous when estimating advertising demand. The reason for this is that, first, the survey
information on reader demographics, including on multi-homing behavior, is collected bi-annually. To
the extent that they do not carry out additional surveys themselves, advertisers can be expected to base
their advertising decisions on this demographic information for a period of six month. Thus, in the es-
timation, this information is predetermined. Secondly, we do not estimate random effects on the reader
side of the market. Hence, in a potential simulation exercise, there will be no changes in the composition
of readers following price increases.
There are different possibilities to model the budget effect, i.e., the effect of a change in total ad-
vertising expenditures xtd on newspaper level demand. In equation 7, this effect is captured by d j, the
coefficient on ln( xtdPtd ) that links the top level with the newspaper level demand. One possibility is to inter-
act ln( xtdPtd ) with newspaper dummy variables, as the effect of a change in total advertising expenditures
xtd can affect the sales shares w jtd differently for each newspaper: for some newspapers, an increase
in total advertising expenditures on national print newspapers will increase their advertising sales more
than proportionally, for other newspapers, the increase can be less than proportional. Specifying the
d j as newspaper dummy variables also provides a natural specification test. Since w jtd is the advertis-
ing sales share of newspaper j out of all newspapers, the advertising sales shares add up to one across
newspapers. This implies that if w jtd increases for some newspapers following an increase in total ad-
vertising expenditures xtd , the sales share of some other newspaper must decrease, i.e., the newspaper
specific coefficients must add up to zero (∑Jj=1 d j = 0). If this is not the case, the model is misspecified.
Another possibility is to specify d j as a function of newspaper characteristics, where this function can






be specified in such a way that the restriction on the sum of the effects across newspapers adding up
to zero holds by construction. In particular, we construct newspaper/weekday-specific d js as the mean
newspaper/weekday-specific characteristic minus the weekday-specific mean of this characteristic across
newspapers.16 Constructing the d js in this way implies that the sum of the effects across newspapers is
zero by construction on each day of the week. Another advantage of making d j a function of newspaper
characteristics is that it allows for studying which newspaper characteristics actually influence the link
between total advertising expenditure xtd and the newspapers’ advertising sales shares w jtd .
Advertising prices as well as newspaper circulation are endogenous and must be instrumented for
in the estimation. Following Slade (2004), we use product characteristics of competing newspapers
as instruments for price (i.e. BLP instruments). In particular, we use the sum across competitors of
the percentage of female readers as well as the mean age of readers to instrument for own advertising
price. In addition, we use the cost shifter real paper cost per page to instrument own advertising price.
Newspaper circulation is instrumented with the real paper cost per issue as well as the dummy for the
day of the week when a magazine of general information is bundled with the newspaper. Increases
in the printing costs should increase the newspaper price and, hence, decrease reader demand, while
adding a magazine to the newspaper increases reader demand (see estimation results on readers’ demand
in Section 5). Using the dummy for a magazine of general information as instrument for circulation
relies on the assumption that the presence of the magazine does not directly influence the demand for
advertising space on the newspaper (other than through its effect on newspaper circulation). Lastly, as
total advertising expenditures xtd are constructed from prices and quantity variables, they are also treated
as endogenous and instrumented with GDP.






−d j if k = j
b jkt
w jt
−d j wktw jt if k 6= j
(11)
with b j jt potentially being a function of own product characteristics and b jkt being a function of the
closeness measures.
Unconditional advertising price elasticities also need to account for how advertising price increases
by one newspaper change the overall price index for advertising in newspapers, how this in turn then
changes the overall demand for advertising in print newspapers at the top level relative to other media
outlets (overall elasticity of advertising demand in national newspapers), and how this change in total
advertising expenditures xtd then affects the advertising quantity demanded on newspaper j (budget
effect). The unconditional price elasticities for advertising demand η jk take these effects into account
and are given by:
16For example, if the respective newspaper characteristic is the newspaper circulation, the measure d jd for Corriere della Sera
on Mondays would be defined as the mean circulation of Corriere della Sera on Mondays minus the mean newspaper circulation
on Mondays across all seven newspapers, i.e. d jd = 1T ∑
T






j=1 circulation jtd . This implies that the
circulation related measures add up to zero across newspapers for each day of the week.
18
η jk =
η̃ j j +(1+
d j
w jt




)(β2 +1)wkt if k 6= j
(12)
where β2 is the overall price elasticity of advertising demand in the seven newspapers relative to
other media outlets estimated at the top level (see equation (5)). Since the second term in equation 12
can be negative and larger in absolute value than the conditional cross-price elasticities η̃ jk, unconditional
cross-price elasticities η jk can be negative, even though newspapers are substitutes for advertisers (more
or less close depending on reader characteristics). The negative budget effect depends on the size of the
newspaper in terms of advertising sales share. If a large newspaper increases its advertising price, the
impact on the overall price index for advertising in newspapers is relatively large. In turn, this will lead to
a relatively large decrease in total advertising expenditures xtd at the top level, which lowers advertising
demand on each newspaper j (more or less than proportional). If this effect is larger than the substitution
effect, cross-price elasticities turn negative.
The circulation elasticities of advertising demand ρ jk, which do not depend on total advertising
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(13)
with c j j potentially being a function of own product characteristics and c jk being a function of the
closeness measures.





We present here the results on the estimation of readers’ demand, once under the assumption of single-
homing readers (nested logit at newspaper level) and once under the assumption of double-homing read-
ers (nested logit at bundle level).
The first two specifications in Table 4 show results for readers’ demand assuming single-homing by
readers. The last two columns report instead the specifications that allow for double-homing readers. All
specifications contain nest-specific (i.e. newspaper-type or bundle-type) year fixed effects to account for
the time trend as well as nest-specific month fixed effects to account for seasonality.17
Let us first consider the single-homing specifications. The price coefficient is negative and statisti-
cally significant. The marginal effect suggests that a cover price increase of 10 cents decreases circulation
by between 48K and 126K readers depending on the newspaper. The advertising intensity coefficient is
positive and significant in the baseline specification of column (1). In order to understand whether the
17Results from a specification with non nest-specific month fixed effects, available upon request, are qualitatively similar.
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Table 4: Readers’ Demand









Real cover price -1.301*** -1.199*** -1.326*** -1.120***
(-4.293) (-3.918) (-11.233) (-10.242)
σ 0.177*** 0.218*** 0.736*** 0.729***
(3.087) (3.921) (12.896) (13.117)
Advertising intensity (slots/pages) 0.005*** -0.002
(2.645) (-1.334)
Adv. intensity (slots/pages) - Generalist -0.002 -0.001
(-0.632) (-0.942)
Adv. intensity (slots/pages) - Sport 0.012*** 0.009***
(6.459) (10.445)
Adv. intensity (slots/pages) - Business 0.012* -0.003
(1.829) (-0.883)
Generalist magazine (day) 0.323*** 0.304*** 0.298*** 0.249***
(5.061) (4.769) (11.696) (10.616)
Generalist magazine plus (day) 0.246*** 0.205***
(5.332) (4.942)
Women magazine (day) 0.456*** 0.429*** 0.456*** 0.384***
(4.365) (4.070) (11.715) (10.603)
Women magazine plus (day) 0.411*** 0.355***
(11.762) (11.078)
Economic insert (day) -0.051*** -0.045*** -0.015* -0.005
(-3.218) (-2.953) (-1.752) (-0.613)
Economic insert plus (day) -0.036*** -0.030***
(-3.117) (-2.686)
Local pages -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001
(-0.927) (-0.889) (-1.598) (-0.693)
Observations 8,795 8,795 35,105 35,105
R-squared 0.464 0.470 0.716 0.753
Number of Newspaper/Bundle - Weekday FE 49 49 196 196
Website opening YES YES YES YES
Editor dummy variables YES YES YES YES

















Adjusted R-squared 0.453 0.460 0.713 0.750
Kleibergen Paap stat. 57.13 49.77 279 217.8
p-value KP 1.72e-10 4.52e-08 0 0
Robust z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
indirect network externality is heterogeneous across newspaper types, in column (2) we allow for differ-
ent advertising intensity effects by newspaper type.18 Interestingly, we find that the effect is negative but
insignificant for general interest newspapers, while it is positive for sports and (albeit significant only at
10%) business papers. This result is in line with previous findings: Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007) find
18We assume linear indirect network effects. See Sokullu (2016) for a model that allows for non-linear effects.
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insignificant effects of advertising quantity on readers demand with similar data on generalist newspa-
pers. The positive effect for specialized papers (such as sports and business) may be due to the fact that
advertising in these types of newspapers is also more specialized and targeted, thus being more valuable
to readers. This is also consistent with previous findings: both Kaiser and Wright (2006) for specialized
magazines and Song (2021) for TV magazines find that readers display an ad-loving attitude.
The estimated σ is positive and statistically significant at the 1% significance level, thus showing
that the chosen nesting structure matters.
The other coefficients have the expected signs and are mostly consistent with Argentesi and Filistruc-
chi (2007): both the coefficients for the dummy variables for the day of issue of a magazine of general
information or the day of issue of a women magazine are positive and statistically significant at the 1%
level. The coefficient for the dummy variable for the day of issue of an economic insert instead has a
negative effect. The number of local pages in a newspaper does not significantly impact readers’ demand.
For the website dummy variables interacted with internet penetration rate, which account for the launch
of a website by a given newspaper, the coefficients are jointly insignificant. We also include a set of
editor dummy variables in the estimation. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and corrected for
autocorrelation of order 1. The Kleibergen-Paap test statistic for weak instruments indicates that there is
no problem of weak instruments in the first stages.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 4 show the estimation results for readers’ demand accounting for
double-homing by readers. The structure of the nests is richer than in the single-homing specification.
Since demand is now modelled as demand for bundles of one or two newspapers, in addition to the
outside good, there are now not only the nests of generalist, of sport, and of financial newspapers, but
also the nests of generalists and sport, of generalist and financial, and of sport and financial bundles. See
Figure 3 in Appendix A.3 for a description of the structure of the nests.
The estimated price coefficient is negative and significant at the 1% significance level in both specifi-
cations (3) and (4). The magnitude of the price coefficient is slightly larger than in the estimations under
the assumption of single-homing by readers. Note that estimated coefficients are not directly compara-
ble and do not allow for conclusions regarding which coefficients drive differences in elasticities as the
single-homing model is estimated at the newspaper level while the double-homing model is estimated
at the bundle level. The meaningful comparison is in terms of price elasticities, as we discuss below.
Computing the marginal effects at the newspaper level suggests that a cover price increase of 10 cents
decreases circulation on average between 58K and 298K readers depending on the newspaper. The ad-
vertising intensity coefficient is insignificant in specification (3). However, when allowing for different
effects by newspaper type (column (4)), it appears that the effect is positive for sports newspapers, simi-
lar to the single-homing case (although it becomes insignificant for the business paper). The estimated σ
is again positive and significant at the 1% significance level and much larger than the nesting parameter
in the estimations under the assumption of single-homing by readers. This is due to the fact that, when
we account for double-homing, there are more and closer options/bundles to switch to within a nest.
The other coefficients have the expected signs: both the coefficients for the dummy variables for
the day of issue of a magazine of general information or the day of issue of a women magazine are
positive and statistically significant. Again, the coefficient of the dummy variable for the issue of an
economic insert is negative but barely insignificant. The dummy variables for the day of issue of a
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specific magazine or insert now measure whether there is at least one of these magazines/inserts in the
bundle on a particular day. Those variables marked "plus" measure in addition whether there was a
magazine/women magazine/economic insert issued on the same day in both of the newspapers in the
respective bundle. The effect of a second magazine or women’s magazine in the bundle is positive
and significant while the effect of a second economic insert is negative and significant. The number of
local pages in the bundle does not have any significant impact on readers’ demand for the bundle. In
these specifications, most of the coefficients for website introduction are negative and jointly significant.
Thus, introducing websites seems to negatively impact demand for printed newspapers, as in Filistrucchi
(2005). The Kleibergen-Paap test statistic for weak instruments indicates that weak instruments are not
a problem in the first stages.
5.1.2 Elasticities
Table 5 shows the resulting mean own- and cross-price elasticities for the seven newspapers based on
the estimation results of the first column of Table 4, i.e., under the assumption of single-homing readers.
While the mean own-price elasticity varies between -1.26 and -1.47, the cross-price elasticities are small
and vary between 0.008 and 0.16.
While the dataset allowing for double-homing is at the bundle level, the price and network effect
elasticities should still be at the product, i.e. newspaper, level. Thus, we sum over all relevant marginal
effects at the bundle level to obtain the marginal effects at the newspaper level when we account for
double-homing by readers.19 We then multiply these marginal effects with the respective price or adver-
tising intensity (own or cross) and divide by the newspaper’s market share to obtain the elasticities at the
product level.20
Table 6 shows the resulting mean own- and cross-price elasticities for the seven newspapers based on
the estimation results of the third column in Table 4, i.e. under the assumption of double-homing readers.
Firstly, the mean own-price elasticities now vary between -1.28 and -3.95, which are much larger than
the estimated mean own-price elasticities based on the assumption of single-homing readers. This is an
intuitive result, since multi-homing readers can react to a price increase of a newspaper A in their bundle
of newspapers AB by switching to a close bundle containing B but not A. Thus, they may be more price-
sensitive than single-homing readers, whose only alternative in case of a price change by a newspaper is
switching to a completely different newspaper.
Secondly, note that cross-price elasticities can now be positive or negative. In particular, we find
that cross-price elasticities between newspapers of the same type (i.e. generalist, sport, financial) are
positive, while cross-price elasticities between newspapers of different types are negative. This implies
that newspapers of the same newspaper type are substitutes while newspapers of different types are com-
19For example, for the own-price effect of newspaper A, we take into account the effects of a price increase of all bundles
containing newspaper A on all bundles containing newspaper A. For, e.g., the cross-price effect on newspaper A of a price
increase of newspaper B, we take into account the effect of a price increase of all bundles containing newspaper B on all
bundles containing newspaper A. Note that this also includes the own-price effect of bundle AB increasing its price, which is
negative.
20We multiply here with the market share based on the actual circulation of the newspaper contained in the newspaper level
data. However, as a robustness check, we also computed the elasticities based on the newspaper market shares that are implied
by the estimated newspaper circulation resulting from the procedure to create the bundle-level dataset. Qualitative results did
not change when we used these alternative market shares in the computation of elasticities.
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Giornale Repubblica Il Sole Stampa
Corriere -1.470*** 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.042** 0.111** 0.012*** 0.070**
(0.306) (0.002) (0.003) (0.016) (0.043) (0.002) (0.027)
Corriere Sport 0.023*** -1.305*** 0.159** 0.008*** 0.021*** 0.012*** 0.013***
(0.004) (0.268) (0.067) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Gazzetta Sport 0.023*** 0.117** -1.258*** 0.008*** 0.021*** 0.012*** 0.013***
(0.004) (0.049) (0.253) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Giornale 0.122** 0.010*** 0.014*** -1.455*** 0.111** 0.012*** 0.070**
(0.047) (0.002) (0.003) (0.312) (0.043) (0.002) (0.027)
Repubblica 0.121** 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.042** -1.469*** 0.012*** 0.069**
(0.047) (0.002) (0.003) (0.016) (0.307) (0.002) (0.027)
Il Sole 0.023*** 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.008*** 0.021*** -1.306*** 0.013***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.247) (0.002)
Stampa 0.122** 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.042** 0.111** 0.012*** -1.437***
(0.047) (0.002) (0.003) (0.016) (0.043) (0.002) (0.305)
We report the mean elasticities over the years 1992-2006. Bootstrapped standard errors based on 5k bootstrapped samples are
reported in parentheses. Cells report the quantity change of the newspaper in the row following a price change of the
newspaper in the column.





Giornale Repubblica Il Sole Stampa
Corriere -3.479*** -0.006 -0.141*** 0.132** 0.662*** -0.144*** 0.645***
(0.722) (0.011) (0.017) (0.066) (0.256) (0.014) (0.213)
Corriere Sport -0.017 -2.927*** 1.165*** -0.063*** -0.233*** -0.064*** -0.009
(0.026) (0.590) (0.431) (0.007) (0.035) (0.006) (0.007)
Gazzetta Sport -0.235*** 0.857*** -2.416*** -0.033*** -0.023 -0.068*** -0.066***
(0.029) (0.317) (0.416) (0.005) (0.021) (0.007) (0.008)
Giornale 0.382** -0.080*** -0.054*** -3.951*** 0.766*** -0.150*** 0.471***
(0.192) (0.010) (0.008) (0.903) (0.275) (0.015) (0.168)
Repubblica 0.723*** -0.109*** -0.017 0.294*** -3.629*** -0.140*** 0.614***
(0.280) (0.016) (0.013) (0.105) (0.760) (0.014) (0.208)
Il Sole -0.266*** -0.051*** -0.075*** -0.095*** -0.237*** -1.276*** -0.098***
(0.026) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.023) (0.124) (0.010)
Stampa 1.126*** -0.007 -0.071*** 0.282*** 0.984*** -0.093*** -3.796***
(0.372) (0.005) (0.008) (0.101) (0.333) (0.009) (0.836)
We report the mean elasticities over the years 1992-2006. Bootstrapped standard errors based on 5k bootstrapped samples are
reported in parentheses. Cells report the quantity change of the newspaper in the row following a price change of the
newspaper in the column.
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Table 7: Advertisers’ Demand - Top Level
(1)
VARIABLES







Time trend Weekday specific quadratic yearly trend
Seasonality Month Fixed Effects
Kleibergen Paap stat. 22.05
p-value KP 6.37e-05
Robust z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
plements.21 Additionally, the magnitude of the cross-price elasticities is mostly larger than those based
on the assumption of single-homing by readers. Some of the cross-price elasticities are insignificant,
indicating that the newspapers are independent goods. This is the case for the generalist/sports pairs




Here, we present the results on the estimation of advertisers’ demand, first at the top level, where advertis-
ers decide on the budget to spend on advertising in print newspapers and, second, at the newspaper level,
where advertisers decide on how to split this advertising budget across the different newspapers. Since
we aim to highlight the possible bias due to the omission of information on multi-homing by readers, we
present results from two specifications disregarding information on double-homing by readers; the other
two making use of the information on captive readers and overlapping readers between newspapers.
Table 7 shows results for top level advertisers’ demand. The coefficient on the price index is negative
and statistically significant at the 1% significance level, implying an overall price elasticity of advertising
demand in these seven newspapers of 1.7. Thus, aggregate advertising demand seems to be very elastic,
suggesting that printed daily papers are subject to a relevant competitive constraint from other media.
GDP, as an indicator for the overall business cycle, has a positive and statistically significant effect on
overall advertising demand. We account for the time trend by including a weekday-specific quadratic
yearly time trend and allow for seasonality by including month fixed effects.
Table 8 shows the estimation results for advertisers’ demand at the newspaper level. Specifications
(1) and (2) show estimation results when information on single-homing and multi-homing readers is
omitted. Both specifications contain newspaper and weekday fixed effects as well as a newspaper type-
21We also estimated a nested logit model allowing for different σs for each nest. We still find that newspapers of the same
type are substitutes while newspapers of different types are complements.
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specific (generalist, sport, business) quadratic yearly time trend. Seasonality is accounted for by month
fixed effects. The two specifications differ in the way we model d j, the coefficient on ln( xtdPtd ) that links
the top level with the newspaper level advertising demand. While in specification (1) ln( xtdPtd ) is interacted
with newspaper dummy variables, we model d j as a function of newspaper circulation in specification
(2).
Specifications (3) and (4) in Table 8 instead show estimation results for advertisers’ demand at the
newspaper level when information on the percentage of captive readers and the percentage of overlapping
readers is used. As before, the specifications differ in the way we model d j, i.e., whether d j is just a
newspaper specific coefficient (specification 3) or whether d j is modeled as a function of newspaper
characteristics (specification 4).
Consider first specifications (1) and (3). The coefficient on advertising price is negative and sig-
nificant at the 1% significance level in specification (1). The interaction term between the advertising
slot price and the percentage of female readers is positive and significant. This implies that advertisers’
demand is less elastic for newspapers that offer access to more female readers.
In specification (3), we additionally allow the own advertising price elasticity to depend on the per-
centage of captive readers of the newspaper. The coefficient on advertising price is negative and sig-
nificant at the 1% level and much larger in magnitude than in specification (1), when information on
multi-homing by readers is ignored in the estimation of advertising demand. Indeed, when we do not
use information on double-homing by readers on the advertiser side, we implicitly assume that readers
single-home. If advertisers can reach readers via only one newspaper, they should be less price-sensitive
than in the case where they can reach the same reader in more than one newspaper. The interaction term
between the advertising slot price and the percentage of female readers is not just still positive and signif-
icant, but also larger in magnitude than in specification (1). Importantly, the interaction term between the
advertising slot price and the percentage of captive readers is also positive and significant, which implies
that advertisers’ demand is less elastic for newspapers that offer exclusive access to more captive readers.
Consistent with theoretical models, advertisers attach a greater value to exclusive readers. Finally, the
interaction term between price, the percentage of captive readers, and the percentage of female readers is
negative and significant. This might be due to the fact that captive men are more valuable because they
are scarcer than captive women, although we do not have this type of information in our data.
The coefficient on the own circulation is positive and significant at the 1% significance level in both
specifications, highlighting that advertisers value a newspaper more, the more readers this newspaper
reaches (all else equal).
Cross-price effects are modeled as a function of the closeness in the income of newspaper readers
and, in specification (3) when we take into account multi-homing reader information, also as a function
of the overlap in readers between two newspapers. The reader income based cross-price measure is pos-
itive and significant in specification (1), implying that higher prices of competing newspapers increase
own advertising demand and that newspapers are closer substitutes for advertisers if they reach readers
that are similar/close in terms of socio-economic status/income. Advertisers respond to a newspaper’s
price increase by placing ads in an outlet with a similar target audience, thereby minimizing the probabil-
ity of reaching the same readers twice. This is consistent with the fact that there are diminishing returns
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Table 8: Advertisers’ Demand - Newspaper Level
(1) (2) (3) (4)












Log(real price per ad slot) -0.084*** -0.128*** -0.446*** -0.498***
(-5.697) (-4.999) (-6.077) (-8.602)
Log(real price per ad slot)*Log(captive readers) 0.097*** 0.137***
(5.099) (9.725)
Log(real price per ad slot)*Log(female readers) 0.020*** 0.012*** 0.154*** 0.153***
(7.049) (3.805) (7.540) (9.998)
Log(real price per ad slot)*Log(captive readers) -0.034*** -0.042***
*Log(female readers) (-6.211) (-10.427)
Log(circulation) 0.258*** 0.424*** 0.283*** 0.295***
(15.232) (14.923) (17.305) (17.944)
Readers’ income cross-price measure 0.014*** 0.020*** 0.003 0.017***
(6.540) (6.276) (1.412) (9.028)
Joint readers cross-price measure 0.020*** 0.031***
(2.694) (5.363)
Same type cross-circulation measure -0.006*** -0.003*** -0.006*** -0.005***
(-11.071) (-4.444) (-8.854) (-7.619)
Log(xt/Pt)*Corriere 0.016 -0.073***
(0.878) (-3.924)
Log(xt/Pt)*Corriere Sport 0.256*** 0.169***
(14.033) (11.127)












Log(xt/Pt)*Diff(circulation*captive readers) (Mio.) -0.002***
(-5.647)
Observations 8,795 8,795 8,795 8,795
Number of id 7 7 7 7
Newspaper Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Weekday Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Type specific quadratic yearly trend YES YES YES YES
Month Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Kleibergen Paap stat. 416.8 230.3 482.3 470.3
p-value KP 0 0 0 0
Chi-squared ∑Jj=1 d j = 0 135.9 51.02
p-value 0 0
Robust z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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to advertising,22 and it is even more evident when we include information on readers multi-homing in
the estimation. The coefficient on the joint readers cross-price measure in specification (3) is positive
and significant, showing that newspapers are closer substitutes for advertisers if they have a higher share
of readers in common; i.e., if these readers can be reached via either of the two newspapers. The co-
efficient is also much larger in magnitude than that for the reader income based cross-price measure in
specification (1), thus the overlap in readers seems to be a more important determinant of substitutability
of newspapers for advertisers than readers’ income. In particular, the reader income based cross-price
measure is no longer significant in specification (3) where we allow cross-price effects to depend on the
share of common readers. Indeed, if advertisers want to avoid reaching readers twice, the overlap in
readers is certainly a more informative measure than their average income.
Cross-circulation effects are modeled as a function of the discrete closeness measure of newspaper
type in both specifications. The negative and statistically significant coefficient on the same type cross-
circulation measure shows that higher circulation of competing newspapers of the same newspaper type
decreases own advertising demand.
Lastly, not all ln( xtdPtd ) terms are statistically significant in specifications (1) and (3), indicating that,
for some newspapers, an increase in the overall print advertising budget does not affect their advertising
sales share, while other newspapers gain or lose sales share with increasing overall print newspaper
advertising expenditures. As discussed in Section 4, the theoretical model implies that ∑Jj=1 d j = 0 must
hold. We do not impose this constraint ex ante, but estimate the unrestricted model and test whether
the constraint holds ex post. The H0 hypothesis of all d j adding up to zero is clearly rejected both in
specifications (1) and (3). This implies that advertiser demand might be misspecified and that the way
of modelling the link between top level and newspaper level demand is crucial for correctly estimating
advertising demand.
Thus, we go one step further by investigating which newspaper characteristics drive whether d j is
negative or positive. Note that in specification (3), the d j is negative for Corriere della Sera and La
Repubblica. These are the largest newspapers both in terms of circulation and advertising expenditure
share. The negative d j implies that if total advertising expenditure xtd increases, the advertising sales
share of these large newspapers decreases. Inversely, it implies that if total advertising expenditure xtd
decreases, the advertising sales share of Corriere della Sera and La Repubblica increases. Thus, these two
newspapers are kind of "must-have" newspapers for advertisers: If they decide to advertise in national
print newspapers, then they first place ads in these two newspapers. Only if the overall advertising budget
for print newspapers increases, ads will be placed also in other newspapers. Therefore, we model d j as
a function of newspapers size, measured by circulation, in specification (2). As explained in section
4, we use the difference between the newspaper circulation and the mean circulation across the seven
newspapers, in order to ensure that the restriction of ∑Jj=1 d j = 0 holds by construction. Indeed, the
coefficient on ln( xtdPtd ) interacted with the circulation measure is negative and statistically significant. This
implies that if a newspaper has a circulation higher than the average circulation across newspapers, its
advertising sales share decreases if total advertising expenditure xtd increases. Conversely, if a newspaper
is small in the sense that its circulation is lower than the average circulation, its advertising sales share
increases following an increase in total advertising expenditure xtd .
22See for instance Athey, Calvano, and Gans (2018).
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Lastly, in specification (4), where reader multi-homing is taken into account, we take the idea of
"must-have" newspapers one step further. Rather than making d j a function of circulation only, we use
the information on single-homing readers and model d j as a function of captive circulation. Indeed, the
estimated coefficient is negative and statistically significant, while all other estimated coefficients are in
line with the results of specification (3). The intuition behind this negative effect is that a newspaper
is a "must-have" newspaper for advertisers not only the higher its circulation but also the higher its
number of captive readers. This evidence is consistent with the theoretical finding that, by placing ads
in newspapers with a larger and more exclusive readership, advertisers avoid duplicating ad impressions
(see Athey, Calvano, and Gans (2018)).
The other estimated coefficients are in line with the previous specifications.
5.2.2 Elasticities
As we have shown that taking into account information on single-homing and multi-homing readers is
crucial for correctly estimating advertising demand, we present price elasticities as well as network effect
elasticities based only on specification (4). Table 9 shows the resulting mean conditional own- and cross-
price elasticities for advertising demand of the seven newspapers based on specification (4). The mean
conditional own-price elasticity varies between -0.86 and -1.08. The statistically significant conditional
cross-price elasticities vary between 0.007 and 0.31.






Giornale Repubblica Il Sole Stampa
Corriere -1.001*** 0.010*** 0.024*** 0.016*** 0.049*** 0.029*** 0.019***
(0.048) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002)
Corriere Sport -0.030 -0.979** 0.310*** 0.016** 0.001 -0.020 -0.012
(0.022) (0.425) (0.065) (0.007) (0.026) (0.013) (0.011)
Gazzetta Sport 0.108*** 0.113*** -0.863*** 0.031*** 0.079*** 0.047*** 0.056***
(0.018) (0.020) (0.239) (0.005) (0.012) (0.007) (0.008)
Giornale 0.000 0.020*** 0.057*** -0.943*** -0.030 0.016 -0.020
(0.031) (0.008) (0.018) (0.258) (0.024) (0.019) (0.012)
Repubblica 0.055*** 0.012*** 0.019*** 0.017*** -1.010*** 0.032*** 0.022***
(0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.052) (0.004) (0.003)
Il Sole 0.007 0.007*** 0.019*** 0.016*** 0.012 -0.990*** -0.001
(0.012) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.011) (0.103) (0.005)
Stampa 0.042*** 0.013*** 0.032*** 0.015*** 0.044*** 0.030*** -1.082***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.094)
We report the mean elasticities over the years 1992-2006. Bootstrapped standard errors based on 5k bootstrapped samples are
reported in parentheses. Cells report the quantity change of the newspaper in the row following a price change of the
newspaper in the column.
Looking at the formula for the conditional own-price elasticity in equation (11), note first that the
b j j will increase, the higher the percentage of female readers and captive readers of newspaper j. This
implies that newspapers with a high percentage of captive or a high percentage of female readers should
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have a smaller own-price elasticity, ceteris paribus. However, the interaction term between price, the
percentage of captive readers, and the percentage of female readers is negative in specification (4). This
implies that advertisers’ demand is less elastic for newspapers that offer exclusive access to more captive
readers, particularly if the latter are men. Secondly, note that a positive (negative) d j implies a higher
(lower) conditional own-price elasticity (in absolute value) via its effect on the price index Ptd , which in
turn has an effect on the expenditure share w jtd . This implies that a newspaper for which the estimated d j
is positive should have a larger conditional own-price elasticity than a newspaper with a negative estimate
of d j, ceteris paribus. Lastly, the conditional own-price elasticity also depends on the advertising sales
share w jtd . However, whether a high advertising sales share increases or decreases the conditional own-
price elasticity depends on the sign of the marginal effect of price on the sales share w jtd , i.e., the sign
of the b j j. The average marginal effect of own price on the expenditure share w jtd is positive for all
newspapers based on the results of specification (4), i.e., the quantity decreases by less than the price
increases, implying inelastic demand. Secondly, given that the b j j is positive, a high advertising sales
share w jtd actually increases the own-price elasticity (in absolute value), implying more elastic demand.
The interaction between all of these effects determines the conditional own-price elasticity.
Corriere della Sera, La Repubblica, and La Stampa have the highest conditional own-price elastici-
ties, while the two sport newspapers, Corriere dello Sport and Gazzetta dello Sport, have relatively lower
conditional own-price elasticities (in absolute value) in Table 9. The relatively high own-price elasticities
of Corriere della Sera and La Repubblica can be explained by their high advertising sales share w jtd (28%
and 26%, respectively, compared to a mean across newspapers of 14%), while the high own-price elastic-
ity of La Stampa is driven by its high share of both female and captive readers (42% and 62% compared
to means across newspapers of 32% and 43%, respectively). While either a high share of female or a
high share of captive readers lead to a low own-price elasticity, if both percentages are high, the negative
interaction effect leading to more elastic demand, kicks in. The relatively low own-price elasticities of
the two sport newspapers, on the other hand, can be explained by the relatively large positive average
marginal effect driven by the relatively many single-homing male readers as well as the low advertising
sales share (4% and 6% compared to a mean across newspapers of 14%), implying less elastic demand.23
The cross-price elasticities between two newspapers will be higher the more similar two newspapers
are in terms of socio-economic status of their readers and the more joint readers two newspapers have,
ceteris paribus (see the formula for the conditional cross-price elasticities in equation (11)). Secondly,
note that a positive (negative) d j implies a lower (higher) conditional cross-price elasticity. Lastly, the
conditional cross-price elasticities also depend on the advertising sales shares of newspapers j and k, w jtd
and wktd . The effects of w jtd and wktd on the cross-price elasticity depend on the sign of the d j. Thus,
the interaction between all of these effects determines the conditional cross-price elasticities. Note, in
particular, the relatively large cross-price elasticities between the two sport newspapers, Corriere dello
Sport and Gazzetta dello Sport, in Table 9. Their cross-price elasticities are driven by the high share of
readers that these two newspapers have in common (see Table 1) as well as their low advertising sales
shares w jtd .
Unconditional advertising price elasticities also need to take into account how advertising price in-
creases by one newspaper change the overall price index for advertising in newspapers, how this in turn
23See Appendix A.6 for the relevant newspaper level summary statistics.
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Giornale Repubblica Il Sole Stampa
Corriere -1.189*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.022*** -0.126*** -0.079*** -0.076***
(0.049) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003)
Corriere Sport -0.321*** -1.017** 0.249*** -0.042*** -0.276*** -0.190*** -0.159***
(0.030) (0.425) (0.064) (0.008) (0.033) (0.018) (0.015)
Gazzetta Sport -0.079*** 0.087*** -0.904*** -0.006 -0.097*** -0.062*** -0.039***
(0.018) (0.020) (0.239) (0.005) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008)
Giornale -0.310*** -0.023*** -0.011 -1.002*** -0.318*** -0.160*** -0.175***
(0.040) (0.008) (0.018) (0.258) (0.034) (0.024) (0.018)
Repubblica -0.128*** -0.013*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -1.183*** -0.076*** -0.071***
(0.008) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.051) (0.005) (0.004)
Il Sole -0.233*** -0.026*** -0.035*** -0.031*** -0.210*** -1.124*** -0.122***
(0.015) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.014) (0.103) (0.007)
Stampa -0.147*** -0.013*** -0.010* -0.023*** -0.132*** -0.080*** -1.178***
(0.006) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.007) (0.005) (0.094)
We report the mean elasticities over the years 1992-2006. Bootstrapped standard errors based on 5k bootstrapped samples are
reported in parentheses. Cells report the quantity change of the newspaper in the row following a price change of the
newspaper in the column.
then changes the overall demand for advertising in print newspapers at the top level (relative to other me-
dia outlets), and how this change in total advertising expenditures xtd then affects the advertising quantity
demanded on newspaper j (budget effect). The unconditional price-elasticities for advertising demand
take these effects into account and are given in Table 10 based on the estimation results of specification
(4). Given that a price increase by one newspaper will result in a price increase in the price index Ptd ,
which subsequently leads to a decrease in the overall budget spend on advertising in national print news-
papers at the top-level, we expect own-price elasticities to increase (in absolute value) and cross-price
elasticities to decrease.
This is reflected in the unconditional price elasticities in Table 10. All own-price elasticities are
higher in absolute value than the conditional ones and now vary between -0.9 and -1.19. In particu-
lar, when taking the change in total advertising expenditures for newspapers into account, advertising
demand for all newspapers, except Gazzetta dello Sport, is now elastic. All cross-price elasticities are
lower than the conditional ones, to the point where most of the positive conditional cross-price elas-
ticities turn into negative unconditional cross-price elasticities. In these cases, the positive substitution
effect is dominated by the negative budget effect: a price increase by newspaper k leads to an increase
in the price index Ptd , which leads to a subsequent decrease in the overall budget spent (in real terms)
on advertising in national print newspapers at the top-level, which in turn lowers the advertising quantity
demanded on newspaper j. One exception are the unconditional cross-price elasticities between the two
sport newspapers, Corriere dello Sport and Gazzetta dello Sport, which remain positive. Here, the pos-
itive substitution effect dominates the negative budget effect, for two reasons. Firstly, as noted before,
the two newspapers have many readers in common and, therefore, are close substitutes. Secondly, both
newspapers are small in terms of advertising sales share implying a small budget effect. The importance
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of newspaper size (in terms of advertising sales share) for the budget effect is also reflected in both the
own- and cross-price elasticities of the two largest newspapers Corriere della Sera and La Repubblica.
Given their size, a price increase by one of these newspapers leads to a large increase in the price index
and, therefore, large decrease in total advertising expenditures xtd set at the top level. This large budget
effect is reflected in the large changes between conditional and unconditional elasticities for these two
newspapers (comparing columns 1 and 5 of Table 9 and Table 10).
Lastly, Table 11 shows the own- and cross-network effect elasticities based on the newspaper level
advertising demand estimation results of specification (4). As the cross-circulation effects are modelled
as a function of the discrete closeness measure of newspaper type, cross-circulation effects are zero by
construction between newspapers of different newspaper types. Own-network effect elasticities vary be-
tween 1.12 and 9.52, while the cross-network effect elasticities are small and vary between -0.17 and
-0.02. Note that the own-network effect elasticities are given by the coefficient on the own circulation
divided by the advertising sales share w jt of newspaper j (see equation (13)). This implies that newspa-
pers with a low advertising sales share will have larger own-network effect elasticities, which is the case
for Corriere dello Sport, Gazzetta dello Sport, and Il Giornale.




General Interest Sports Business
Corriere 1.108*** -0.020*** 0 0
(0.077) (0.002) - -
Corriere Sport 9.518*** 0 -0.174*** 0
(0.662) - (0.021) -
Gazzetta Sport 5.616*** 0 -0.103*** 0
(0.389) - (0.013) -
Giornale 5.777*** -0.106*** 0 0
(0.397) (0.013) - -
Repubblica 1.174*** -0.021*** 0 0
(0.083) (0.003) - -
Il Sole 2.230*** 0 0 -
(0.154) - - -
Stampa 2.199*** -0.040*** 0 0
(0.152) (0.005) - -
We report the mean elasticities over the years 1992-2006. Bootstrapped standard errors based on 5k bootstrapped samples are
reported in parentheses. Cells report the quantity change of the newspaper in the row following a change in the circulation of
the newspaper in the column. Cross-circulation elasticities across different newspaper types are zero by construction.
31
6 Conclusion
We study the role of multi-homing in the newspaper market. First, we build a micro-founded structural
econometric model that encompasses the demand for differentiated products on both sides of the market
and allows for multi-homing on each side of the market. We then estimate the model above alternatively
taking into account and not taking into account information on multi-homing by readers. We show that
incorporating multi-homing has important implications on both the readers side and the advertising side
of the market.
Results for the readers’ side of the market show that not accounting for multi-homing leads to a
substantial bias in the estimation of own- and cross-price elasticities as well as own- and cross-network
effect elasticities. In particular, mean own-price elasticities are substantially higher when multi-homing
by readers is taken into account in the demand estimation. This is due to the fact that switching to a dif-
ferent bundle of newspapers is easier for a multi-homing reader than switching to a different newspaper is
for a single-homing reader. Furthermore, while we find that newspapers of the same type are substitutes,
newspapers of different types are found to be complements in the model accounting for multi-homing.
However, a discrete choice model at the newspaper level assumes that all readers single-home and that
all newspapers are substitutes.
Readers’ multi-homing information also has important implications for the advertising side of the
market. In particular, we find that own-price elasticities on the advertising side decrease with the share
of exclusive readers while cross-price elasticities increase with the share of overlapping readers between
newspapers. We also find that some newspapers are "must have" for advertisers, thanks to their large
circulation and number of exclusive readers. These findings are largely consistent with the theoretical
literature on multi-homing in two sided-markets, which stresses the role of readership composition (i.e.
captive vs overlapping) for advertising demand.
Therefore, our paper contributes to the economic literature on two-sided markets, in which empirical
work accounting for multi-homing is still quite scarce. Moreover, our contribution allows for a better
understanding of how multi-homing by users in platform markets matters and how it influences price
elasticities on both sides of the market. This is likely to bias the conclusions of such exercises as market
definition or merger evaluation in which both own- and cross-price elasticities and own- and cross-
network effect elasticities play a crucial role. Thus, it can be useful for competition and regulation
authorities to improve their quantitative assessment in cases involving two-sided platforms.
While print newspapers are a classical example of an offline two-sided market, the empirical part
of this paper should be seen as an application allowing for studying the role of multi-homing in (non-
transaction) platform markets. The methodology can also be applied to other two-sided markets for
which data on user multi-homing is available. Especially in light of the prevalence and rising importance
of multi-sided platforms in digital markets and the relevance of multi-homing by users, the results and
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Table 12: Used Data and Corresponding Data Sources
Data Source
Newspaper Data
Average prints Accertamenti Diffusione Stampa
Cover prices Newspaper publishers
Magazines, inserts, local pages, websites, editors Newspaper publishers
Number of pages Nielsen Media Research
Advertising quantities and revenues Nielsen Media Research
Data on multi-homing readers Audipress




Italian consumer price index OECD
Italian population above 14 ISTAT
Italian GDP OECD
Paper price Camera di Commercio di Milano
Hourly wage index printed media sector ISTAT
Journalist hourly wage index ISTAT
Electricity prices for industrial consumers Eurostat
Italian internet penetration rate ISTAT
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A.2 Construction of Bundle Level Dataset
In order to estimate readers’ demand accounting for multi-homing by readers, we estimate a demand
equation where consumers are allowed to read up to two newspapers (which is what we observe in the
data). Thus, readers are allowed to choose between all possible pairs of newspapers, including single-
homing on a newspaper.
Hence, we construct a dataset in which the level of observation is no longer a newspaper at a partic-
ular point in time but a bundle of up to two newspapers for a given average weekday within a month.
We construct the monthly average circulation for each day of the week for a given bundle based on
the survey data on multi-homing behavior of readers. First, for each newspaper we compute the share
of single-homing (captive) readers, which also includes readers of other newspapers not included in our
sample. Multiplying this share of single-homing readers with the circulation of the newspaper gives the
circulation of the single-homing "bundle" at a particular point in time.
Constructing the circulation of a bundle of two newspapers is more complicated as double-homing
reader percentages are not symmetric. For example, the percentage of readers of newspaper A who
also read newspaper B will not be the same as the percentage of readers of newspaper B who also read
newspaper A. However, multiplying these percentages with the respective newspaper circulation provides
a lower and an upper bound for the circulation of the bundle of the two newspapers at a particular point
in time.
We then must decide on the optimal point within the interval between lower and upper bound bun-
dle circulation. Of course, setting bundle circulation to any value within this interval implies that, if
we calculate newspaper circulation as the sum of the circulation of all bundles containing that partic-
ular newspaper, overall newspaper level circulation will not be equal to the actual circulation of that
newspaper in the original data.
Therefore, we choose the optimal point in the interval between lower and upper bound bundle cir-
culation so as to minimize the difference between actual and estimated newspaper circulation for the
seven newspapers at each point in time. We do so by running constrained regressions for each half-year
period (the interval at which we have information on reader multi-homing). The dependent variable in
this regression is the circulation of the respective newspaper minus the single-homing circulation minus
the lower bound circulations of all bundles including this newspaper. Hence, the dependent variable is
the part of the total newspaper circulation that we still need to distribute across bundles. The independent
variables are then the differences between upper and lower bound circulation for all possible bundles of
two newspapers, where this difference is set to zero for all bundles that do not include the respective
newspaper. We then run constrained OLS regressions, in which all the coefficients are constrained to lie
between zero and one - thus, the estimated coefficients give us the optimal points in the respective in-
tervals between lower and upper bound bundle circulation for all bundles of two newspapers. We repeat
this constrained regression for every half year period in the dataset and construct the bundle circulation
for all bundles of two newspapers based on the estimated optimal points in the interval between lower
and upper bound bundle circulation.
As mentioned before, this procedure implies that if we collapse the bundle level dataset back to the
newspaper level, circulation at the newspaper level will not be equal to the actual newspaper circulation
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of the original dataset. Table 13 shows the mean actual and mean estimated newspaper circulation as
well as the mean percentage difference between the two. The percentage difference between actual and
estimated newspaper circulation based on the constrained regression procedure is always lower than 8%.
Table 13: Difference between Actual and Estimated Circulation by Newspaper




Corriere 866,130 850,469 1.52
Corriere Sport 428,295 414,402 2.59
Gazzetta Sport 584,629 608,265 -4.28
Giornale 315,328 292,570 7.24
Repubblica 799,423 808,024 -1.48
Il Sole 462,816 443,114 4.22
Stampa 521,152 511,133 1.81
The construction of the other variables in the bundle level dataset is straightforward: the bundle
price is the sum of the two newspaper prices, advertising intensity is the sum of advertising slots in both
newspapers divided by the total number of pages of the two newspapers, the paper cost is the sum of the
two newspaper costs, and the number of local pages is the sum of the local pages of the two newspapers.
For the other newspaper characteristics, which are dummy variables (for example the point in time when
the newspaper introduced a website), we also calculate the sum of the two dummy variables. However,
this variable will then only capture when, for example, the first website in the bundle was introduced.
Therefore, we define additional variables for those product characteristics that capture the change from
zero to one for the second newspaper included in the bundle.
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A.3 Structure of Nests
Figure 2: Structure of Nests - Single-Homing Readers’ Demand
Figure 3: Structure of Nests - Double-Homing Readers’ Demand
39
A.4 Closeness Measures
In the newspaper level advertisers’ demand, we model the cross-price and cross-circulation coefficients
b jkt and c jkt as linear functions of distance measures between newspapers j and k. In particular, how close
substitutes two newspapers are in the eyes of advertisers depends on how close these two newspapers are
in characteristics space.
The closeness metrics are derived from differences among newspapers in the demographic character-
istics of readers (age, gender, income), the amount of overlapping readers between the two newspapers,
and the type of newspapers. Essentially, each closeness measure is a 7x7 matrix at each point in time
(month t and day of the week d) that specifies the closeness between all pairs of newspapers.
The closeness measures between newspapers for continuous product characteristics use an inverse
measure of Euclidean distance. In particular, the closeness between newspapers j and k in terms of




. This ensures that the closeness measures between two
newspapers vary between zero and one, so that a one implies that the two newspapers are at the same
location in characteristic space. For example, if the characteristic under consideration is the percentage
of female readers, the related closeness measure between two newspapers would be equal to one if they
had exactly the same percentage of female readers. For closeness measures based on discrete product
characteristics (for example the type of newspaper: generalist, sport, financial), the closeness between
two newspapers is equal to one if they belong to the same group (i.e. are of the same type) and zero
otherwise.
As an example, Table 14 shows the percentage of female readers as well as the newspaper type of
each of the seven newspapers at a given point in time (here the second half of 2006 as the Audipress
survey data on reader characteristics is bi-annual).
Table 14: Newspaper Characteristics Second Half 2006
Female readers (%) Newspaper Type
Corriere 42.6 Generalist
Corriere Sport 10.0 Sport
Gazzetta Sport 10.4 Sport
Giornale 37.9 Generalist
Repubblica 43.8 Generalist
Il Sole 34.1 Business
Stampa 40.0 Generalist
Table 15 shows the resulting closeness metric matrix based on the percentage of female readers for
this particular point in time, while Table 16 shows the resulting closeness metric matrix based on the
discrete newspaper type.
Going back to estimation equation (10), the closeness measures are then multiplied with the respec-
tive log price or circulation and summed up across newspapers. For example, let us assume that news-
paper j is Corriere della Sera and that cross-price elasticities between newspapers are a function of the
closeness in female readers. For each of the other six newspapers, the closeness measure based on female
readers between Corriere della Sera and the respective newspaper k is multiplied with the log price of
40





Giornale Repubblica Il Sole Stampa
Corriere - 0.015 0.015 0.096 0.294 0.056 0.161
Corriere Sport 0.015 - 0.556 0.018 0.015 0.020 0.016
Gazzetta Sport 0.015 0.556 - 0.018 0.015 0.021 0.017
Giornale 0.096 0.018 0.018 - 0.078 0.116 0.192
Repubblica 0.294 0.015 0.015 0.078 - 0.049 0.116
Il Sole 0.056 0.020 0.021 0.116 0.049 - 0.078
Stampa 0.161 0.016 0.017 0.192 0.116 0.078 -
Closeness metrics are rounded to three decimals.





Giornale Repubblica Il Sole Stampa
Corriere - 0 0 1 1 0 1
Corriere Sport 0 - 1 0 0 0 0
Gazzetta Sport 0 1 - 0 0 0 0
Giornale 1 0 0 - 1 0 1
Repubblica 1 0 0 1 - 0 1
Il Sole 0 0 0 0 0 - 0
Stampa 1 0 0 1 1 0 -
newspaper k. These six interaction terms are summed up into one term included in the regression. Thus,
for each closeness/cross-price interaction one λ is estimated and for each closeness/cross-circulation
interaction one τ is estimated. The cross-price and cross-circulation coefficients b jkt and c jkt are then
recovered by replacing the estimated coefficients λl and τm and the closeness measures δ jkt and µ jkt into
equations (8) and (9), respectively.
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A.5 Elasticities Advertisers’ Demand
A.5.1 Conditional Price Elasticities
Differentiating the advertising sales share w jt of newspaper j at time t with respect to own- and cross-
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Now, given the functional form of the estimation equation for w jt in equation (10), the own- and
























= 1pkt [b jkt −d jwkt ] if k 6= j
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−d j if k = j
b jkt
w jt
−d j wktw jt if k 6= j
(17)
Note that the b j jt potentially is a function of own product characteristic while b jkt is a function of the
closeness measures.
A.5.2 Unconditional Price Elasticities
Compared to the price elasticities of advertising demand η̃ jk conditional on total advertising expenditures
xt , the unconditional advertising price elasticities η jk also need to take into account how advertising
price increases by one newspaper change the overall price index for advertising in newspapers, how this
in turn then changes the overall demand for advertising in print newspapers at the top level (relative to
other media outlets), and how this change in total advertising expenditures xt then affects the advertising
quantity demanded on newspaper j. See Heien and Pompelli (1988) for the general formula of the total
own-price elasticity in the AIDS model.
Given the functional form of the estimation equations in equations (5) and (10) and the choice of the
price index Pt , the unconditional price-elasticities for advertising demand η jk are given by:
η jk =
η̃ j j +(1+
d j
w jt




)(β2 +1)wkt if k 6= j
(18)
The additional term in comparison to the conditional price elasticities of advertising demand η̃ jk is
42
the percentage change in advertising quantity q jt demanded on newspaper j following an advertising
price increase of newspaper k that goes via its effect on total advertising expenditure xt :
• wkt is the elasticity of the price index Pt with respect to a change in the advertising price of news-
paper k, pkt .
• (β2 + 1) is the elasticity of total advertising expenditure xt with respect to a change in the price
index Pt (Heien and Pompelli, 1988, p.40), where β2 is the overall price elasticity of advertising
demand in the seven newspapers relative to other media outlets estimated at the top level (see top
level estimation equation (5)).
• (1+ d jw jt ) is the expenditure elasticity, i.e. by how much a change in total advertising expenditure
xt changes the advertising quantity q jt demanded on newspaper j (Alston, Foster, and Green,
1994, p.352). If a change in total advertising expenditure xt leaves the advertising sales share
of newspaper j, w jt , unchanged (i.e. the estimated d j in equation (10) is zero), the expenditure
elasticity is 1. If, instead, w jt changes with a change in xt , the expenditure elasticity of newspaper
j depends on the estimated d j.
A.5.3 Circulation Elasticities
Circulation elasticities, which do not depend on total advertising expenditures xt , are derived in a similar
way as the conditional price elasticities. Differentiating the advertising sales share w jt of newspaper j at
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(20)
Given the functional form of the estimation equation for w jt in equation (10), the own- and cross-
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if k = j
c jkt
w jt
if k 6= j
(22)
with c j jt potentially being a function of own product characteristics and c jkt being a function of the
closeness measures.
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A.6 Determinants of Advertisers’ Demand Elasticities







Corriere 28.06 40.97 45.82
Corriere Sport 3.94 13.08 41.45
Gazzetta Sport 6.21 12.67 50.08
Giornale 5.6 38.44 29.02
Repubblica 26.22 41.24 51.42
Il Sole 16.25 33.55 25.03
Stampa 14.24 41.7 61.63
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